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1. Introduction 
 Although the actions carried out by his government during its first six months in 
office refute it, the election of Ollanta Humala to the presidency of Peru last year seemed 
to reaffirm the tendency towards authoritarian populism that can be noted in Latin 
America since the closing years of the past century. Unquestionably, his initial 
governmental agenda indicated a larger, stronger role for government, one more involved 
in running the economy – vertically – similar to the style of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, 
Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina. 
 The purpose of this paper, however, is not debating the risks inherent in that type 
of government. I hold the risks to be evident, as authoritarian populism contradicts the 
concepts of rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and free markets – the 
concepts on which economic growth depends.2 No economy in the world has experienced 
durable growth in confluence with policies that rely on intervention and gimmicks – even 
less so when such policies are implemented in regimes where checks to government 
action are weak or inexistent. 
 Rather, the purpose of this paper is to argue that the origins of this phenomenon 
lie in the conception of democracy without political parties, since this conception has a 
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dual effect: on one side, it generates demand by citizens for more predictability in 
political processes; on the other, it creates incentives for leaders to become much more 
attentive to timely results, as it makes their continued participation in the political arena 
uncertain. In order to avoid providing the basis for authoritarian populism, then, political 
competition must be structured in terms of parties. 
 Democracies based on political parties represent the lesser evil with regards 
different types of political organization, not heaven on earth. Inasmuch as the access to 
the political market – the market of votes and public policies – is limited in them, they 
risk becoming sclerotic. As Mancur Olson argues, this kind of situation makes it possible 
for groups to pressure governments into designing and implementing policies that only 
benefit their private interests.3 
 There are in the world today – especially in Asia –authoritarian regimes that 
conceive and carry out public policies that are responsible, not populist. These regimes, 
however, must not serve as examples for Latin America, given that much of what they 
achieve occurs through taking advantage of what is designed and developed in Western 
democracies with a party system. Since it combines the incentives for competence and 
continuity in government, such party-based democracy constitutes the model to which 
Latin American countries should look in order to overcome the threat of authoritarian 
populism. 
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2. Comparing Experiences 
 The importance of political parties and party systems becomes evident when 
contrasting the United States and Latin America. Throughout its republican history, the 
party system in the United States has undergone moments of crisis, during which the 
parties are become unaligned and are subsequently realigned in a new order. In the 
country during the 20th century, however, two parties alternated in the exercise of power 
in an orderly fashion, and even more importantly, its index of legislative fragmentation – 
which measures the probability that two representatives chosen randomly from the House 
of Representative will be from different parties – has always remained near 0.50.4 
 The bi-party system of the United States has no wont for criticism from either the 
left or the right: Lani Guinier on one side and Andrew Napolitano from the other coincide 
in accusing it of being hardly democratic or open.5 From their differing ideological 
perspectives, they accuse the bipartisan system of having ended up constituting a cartel 
that does not represent the beliefs and interests of the citizens but rather those of an elite 
entrenched in positions of power. From this perspective, the only difference between 
Republicans and Democrats is how the two words are spelt. 
 Still, despite the economic crisis and the destruction of the dollar that we are 
currently witnessing, the contrast between the economic performance of the United States 
and that of Latin America is telling. In present-day dollars, the per capita GDP of the 
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United States, for example, is nearly nine times that of Peru: US$47,199 vs. US$5,401.6 
The disparity results from the difference between what was achieved in each country in 
terms of rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and free markets. 
Inasmuch as public policies can be explained in terms of political structures, the party-
based democracy of the United States has played an important role in the evolution of the 
difference in economic activity. 
 By creating repetitive political contests, party-based democracy incentivizes 
participants to develop strategies to obtain prestige. Non-party-based democracies in 
Latin America, however, generate political contests that are not repetitive, which lead to 
the development of predatory strategies. According to Michael Coppedge, approximately 
1,200 different political parties were represented in the parliaments of eleven Latin 
American countries in the 20th century.7 The volatile character of Latin American 
political parties favors a fixation on the short-term by both rulers and ruled, which leads 
to authoritarian populism. 
 The fragmentation of the Peruvian party system explains the recent victory of 
Ollanta Humala. In 2011, eleven parties nominated candidates for the Presidency of the 
Republic and it was not easy to differentiate between them; Alejandro Toledo and Pedro 
Pablo Kuczynski, for example, despite having led the government together from 2001 – 
2006, ran separately. The subsequent puzzlement this caused many people played to the 
advantage of more polarized candidates, with Humala and Keiko Fujimori making it into 
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the run-off election. In that election, the more populist message of Humala ended up 
earning him the victory by a narrow margin. 
3. Party Formation 
 It is less important, however, to recognize the relevance of political parties than to 
understand how they are formed. In the current trends of political thinking it is difficult to 
find anyone who maintains that political parties are irrelevant to the political organization 
of society. The consensus is so broad in this respect that even the remaining totalitarian 
states such as Cuba and North Korea assert that they have them; the only countries that 
openly dare do without them are proprietary states that lack parliaments such as Saudi 
Arabia and Brunei. 
 Regrettably, no such consensus exists with regards the price one should be ready 
to pay to have a functioning party system. Many people do not accept arguments derived 
from pure political theory or the empirical evidence that proves there is a relationship 
between the existence of political parties and certain systems of representation and rules 
governing political action. These people then propose institutional schemes that, when 
implemented, have serious political and economic consequences. 
 During the past twenty years in Latin America, this vision of political institutions 
has inspired misguided constitutional reforms. Moderate examples of this are the 
Colombia’s 1991 Constitution and Peru’s 1993 one, the extreme example being the 1999 
Venezuelan Constitution. In all of these cases, the reforms deepened the proportional 




bolster their strength and favoring the rise of or consolidation of power by polarizing 
leaders like Alvaro Uribe, Alberto Fujimori, and, in the extreme, Hugo Chávez. 
 In contemporary political science, the functional perspective of political 
institutions is provided by Maurice Duverger and Giovanni Sartori.8 Both have observed 
that political parties tend to consolidate where small districts elect the members of 
congress. In the context of such districts, if votes are split among several parties, the 
district’s leaders have fewer chances of being elected to Congress, for there are a very 
small number of congressional seats per district available. Contrariwise, holding 
congressional elections in large districts promotes the fragmentation of political parties, 
inasmuch as fragmentation in these districts does not impede the leaders of the various 
parties from winning a seat in Congress. The larger the district is, the lower the 
diminishing effect on the number of parties. 
 In places marked by the separation of powers, the character of congressional 
elections, whether favorable or unfavorable to the consolidation of political parties, 
affects presidential elections. In the United States right now, for example, in designating 
its candidate for the 2012 presidential election, the Republicans must not only consider 
which candidate they prefer most, but also which candidate is capable of defeating 
Barack Obama. If they do not, they will simply lose the election. 
 In party-based democracy, decisions regarding the course of action each party 
advocates are bound by what the other party does or intends to do, thus producing a sort 
of fortuitous collaboration in which the deficiencies of each party are limited or 
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compensated by its rival, the end result being greater than the sum of the parts. By 
treating political parties as the “hinges” connecting society and the State, it becomes 
possible to realize the most profound system of weights and counterweights within reach 
of a given society.9 
4. Criticism of Majority Representation 
 Concern for the lack of pluralism that results from the election of congress 
members using the system of majority representation on the basis of small districts has a 
traditional formulation, expressed by John Stuart Mill, as well as a contemporary one, 
principally manifested by Arendt Lijphart.10 Mill was worried by the lack of ideological 
pluralism that impoverishes the debate over public policies; Lijphart, on the other hand, is 
troubled by the lack of social pluralism that results from this system of representation. 
 The latter reservation, however, assumes that voters primarily make their 
decisions based on factors such as the race and gender of candidates, rather than on the 
basis of the candidates’ ideas and behavior. It is not necessarily the case, however, that 
electors choose their representatives on the basis of these criteria: a white man, for 
example, may prefer to vote for a female of mixed race if she promises to lower taxes and 
is honest. As Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman have observed, the capacity for 
monitoring the behavior of representatives is in any case greater in smaller districts.11 
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 It is more complicated to dismiss the concern for the reduced spectrum of ideas 
and proposals that are generated in small districts. As the United States demonstrates, the 
political parties that have endured the process of uninominal congressional elections have 
given rise to the establishment of a stable political process that is relatively predictable, 
but the parties themselves end up resembling each other too much. The only reason to 
prefer this system, then, lies in the observation that, in the long run, the probability of the 
instauration of authoritarian populism is lessened as a consequence of the political 
dynamics that stem from it. 
 In this respect, it is important to remember that it is not necessarily possible to 
extrapolate economic criteria to analyze political realities. In the sphere of economic 
activity, there can be no doubt that competition, or the threat of it, has positive 
consequences: it controls the appetite for profit of producers and induces them to charge 
reasonable prices. Notwithstanding, although both economic and political activities share 
a social nature, they are distinguished by the horizontal or vertical character of the 
relationships involved. Open access to political markets does not necessarily have the 
same positive effects, given that, as they involve vertical relationships, such access may 
not lead to the production of goods.12 
 As Harold Demsetz has noted, if concentration in the political sectors of Western 
democracies is evaluated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), a higher 
concentration is found than in the unregulated industries.13 It so happens, however, that 
this situation is related to the implementation of serious, responsible public policies that, 
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by consequence, lead to the greater economic performance of those countries. This occurs 
as a result of the combination of the incentives of competition and continuity in political 
activity. 
5. Disturbing European References 
 Why is it that Latin American countries do not follow the example of the United 
States? The answer has something to do with what we will call the disturbing European 
references. Three of the five major European countries elect members of the lower 
chamber of their Parliaments uninominally: the United Kingdom, of course, but also 
France and Germany, following the constitutional reforms carried out in 1958 and 1949, 
respectively. Among the most populated European countries, only Spain and Italy 
employ large electoral districts for the lower house. 
 Yet all of the Nordic countries of Europe – both the Scandinavian countries and 
Holland and Belgium – use large electoral districts in their systems of proportional 
representation. Regrettably, these are the countries that serve as models for Latin 
America, despite the fact that there are other variables – political and non-political – that 
operate in such a way as to provide a source for the stability and continuity of the 
political process. 
 The political institutions that facilitate the rise of a vision for stability and 
continuity in the political process in these countries include their constitutional 
monarchies. In addition, they are helped by their parliamentarian system of government, 
which enables close, flexible interaction between the executive and legislature. In a 




powers, as the government is only a commission of the Parliament. Bipartisanship is 
more relevant for the republics that have separation of powers following the U.S. mode. 
 Furthermore, according to the findings developed in my book, Economic Freedom 
and Political Regimes, several different factors – social, cultural, demographic, and even 
geographic – help explain why populist public policies did not take root in Northern 
Europe.14 Using panel data taken over 15 years for 150 countries, I found in the course of 
my research that the level of urban population, colonial origin, ethnic fragmentation, 
demographic density, size, and latitude of each country have some bearing on this type of 
policy. 
 In accordance with their effect on social integration, social, demographic, and 
geographic variables account for certain perspectives regarding the rule of law, limited 
government, regulatory efficiency, and free markets: greater levels of urban population 
and demographic density, less ethnic fragmentation, and smaller size all contribute to the 
phenomenon. Moreover, Anglo-Saxon colonial origin – used as a dummy variable – also 
has a slight explicative value, as does the distance of the country in question from the 
Equator.  
 The most important finding of this research, however, is that, no matter what 
combination of variables advanced by the corresponding econometric models, the 
political regime – considered with a 5-year delay compared to economic freedom – 
demonstrates the expected quality: the further the country is from perfect bipartisanship – 
that is, the ideal level of legislative fragmentation that corresponds to 0.5 – the less likely 
                                                            




such serious, responsible public policies will be implemented as time passes. One could 
say that although party-based democracy definitely cannot be wholly credited for the 
implementation of correct public policies, it always plays a part. 
6. Natural versus Feigned Bipartisanship 
 Institutional explanations for the success of the United States stress the norms 
contained in its Constitution: in its organic aspect, the horizontal and vertical dismantling 
of government via the separation of powers and federalism; in its doctrinal aspect, the 
rule of law and the protection of civil liberties. Rarely, however, is attention paid to one 
of the by-products of these norms: bipartisanship.  
 The Constitution of the United States does not establish that only two parties will 
in orderly fashion alternate in power, nor that the seats in Congress will be equally 
divided between the representatives of only two parties, but it does establish that the 
members of the House of Representatives will be elected individually, following the 
pattern set for the election of the members of the House of Commons in the United 
Kingdom. As Duverger and Sartori have explained, this system of uninominal election 
generates the characteristic bipartisanship of these Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 In 20th-century Latin America, on the contrary, the dominant system for 
proportional representation is the election of congress members in plurinominal districts. 
It could even be said that Peru and Ecuador have achieved a system of purely 
proportional representation deriving from the election of congress members in one single 




Latin American countries have not gone as far in this direction, but in any case do elect 
their deputies in plurinominal districts. 
 In this context the efforts to instill party systems have been in vain, whether they 
have taken the form of a pact by two parties to take turns in power, as occurred in 
Colombia, or the form of an agreement with regards basic State policies, such as the one 
that existed in Venezuela during the second half of the 20th century. In the absence of a 
system for the election of congress members in small districts, one strategy after another 
has been attempted to impose from above some party system. 
 Even more misguided is the strategy represented by the 2003 Law of Political 
Parties in Peru, which designates the electoral organisms – the National Election 
Commission and, above all, the National Office of Electoral Procedure – to monitor the 
consolidation of parties, ascertaining that they are authentic and that their finances are 
clean. Assessing its effectiveness in the elections of 2006 and 2011, however, has led to 
disappointment, as it was subsequently discovered that the parties were neither as 
consolidated nor the finances as clean as had been indicated. 
 Political parties, then, must grow from the bottom up as a consequence of 
representative systems or rules for political action that create incentives for political 
leaders to come together rather than scatter apart. Being as it is politicians’ desire to be 
elected which defines them, the key is to be found in the electoral rules established by a 
Constitution or by electoral law.15 More than any Law of Political Parties, then, what 
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Latin American countries need is electoral reform capable of bringing about party 
consolidation. 
7. Populism and Authoritarianism 
 Populism and authoritarianism do not necessarily go hand in hand; certainly both 
democratic populism and non-populist authoritarianism can exist. The term populism is 
used to describe demagogic public policies that seek to offer immediate gratification to 
popular demands and end up undermining the well-being of the population in the long 
run, whereas the term authoritarianism refers to the vertical character of a political 
regime. Following the lead of William H. Riker, we may hold liberalism as the opposite 
of populism,16 while the opposite of authoritarianism is democracy. 
 The causes of authoritarianism are principally political; it is a backswing that 
takes place in democracies without political parties. Populism, however, has primarily 
ideological causes, as it results from a deficient understanding of the economy, but also 
has a source in perverse incentives that lead to the predomination of short-term interests. 
As has been argued in this paper, democracy without political parties eventually 
produces, in a fashion similar to the process by which bacteria are cultured, the 
conditions from which both authoritarianism and populism naturally arise. 
 The primary vaccination against populism is the education afforded by 
historically bad experiences. Thus, just as what led China to liberalize its economy were 
the lessons of its Communist years from 1948-78, what is preventing Ollanta Humala 
from dismantling the market reforms of the last two decades is the memory of Peru’s 
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experience of governmental intervention in the economy of the 1970s and 1980s. After 
Cuba under Fidel, Peru was the country that “advanced” the farthest in establishing a 
state-run economy under the government of General Juan Velasco (1968-75). 
 Still, the lessons learned from historical experiences may fade with the passage of 
time; living through hyperinflation is much different than reading about it in textbooks. 
The next generations could easily forget what it means. That is why the slight difference 







The following tables incorporate five econometric models to demonstrate the affirmation regarding 
economic freedom over time. They are taken from Sardón (2010). 
 
Table 1 
THE EFFECT OF POLTICAL REGIME ON ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
reg_pol - 4.09 * - 3.96 * - 3.51 * - 3.45 * - 3.92 * 
 (0.90) (0.94) (0.90) (0.90) (0.94) 
urbpop  0.19 * 0.17 * 0.18 * 0.19 * 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
col_orig  3.56 ** 4.13 ** 4.02 ** 3.58 ** 
  (1.62) (1.83) (1.87) (1.63) 
etfra  - 5.10 **   - 4.52 *** 
  (2.59)   (2.66) 
densi  2.06 ** 2.41 **   
  (1.04) (1.13)   
lat_abst   9.07 ** 8.05 ***  




ln_area    - 0.72 *** - 0.74 ** 
    (0.39) (0.38) 
constant 59.94 * 51.89 * 46.55 * 55.61 * 60.61 * 
 (0.87) (2.11) (1.98) (5.33) (4.94) 
      
Observations 1943 1777 1943 1943 1777 
Groups 148 136 148 148 136 






THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE VARIABILITY OF 
LEGISLATIVE FRAGMENTATION ON ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
reg_pol     - 3.52 * 
     (0.90) 
presid_reg_pol - 6.35 * - 5.51 * - 5.25 *   
 (0.99) (0.99) (0.99)   
var_tf    - 36.05 *** - 38.58 ** 
    (20.81) (19.69) 
urbpop  0.16 * 0.18 * 0.18 * 0.16 * 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
col_orig  3.55 ** 3.21 ** 3.47 ***  
  (1.76) (1.54) (1.85)  




   (2.46)   
densi  2.32 ** 1.95 *** 2.18 *** 2.45 ** 
  (1.11) (1.00) (1.19) (1.12) 
lat_abst  8.23 **    
  (4.14)    
constant 59.99 * 47.68 * 52.19 * 49.01 * 51.83 * 
 (0.79) (1.93) (2.02) (2.10) (1.90) 
      
Observations 1935 1935 1769 2133 1943 
Groups 148 148 136 150 148 
R - squared 0.18 0.30 0.37 0.22 0.25 
 
 
 
 
